The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited

@article{Ghijsen2015TheBP,
  title={The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited},
  author={Harmen Ghijsen},
  journal={Erkenntnis},
  year={2015},
  volume={80},
  pages={1147-1156}
}
Duncan Pritchard has defended a version of epistemological disjunctivism which holds that in a paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge, one knows that $$p$$p in virtue of having the reflectively accessible reason that one sees that $$p$$p. This view faces what is known as the basis problem: if seeing that $$p$$p just is a way of knowing that $$p$$p, then that one sees that $$p$$p cannot constitute the rational basis in virtue of which one knows that $$p$$p. To solve this problem, Pritchard… CONTINUE READING
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