• DOI:10.1086/240187
• Corpus ID: 143628536

The Austrian Army in the Age of Metternich

@article{Rothenberg1968TheAA,
  title={The Austrian Army in the Age of Metternich},
  author={Gunther Erich Rothenberg},
  journal={The Journal of Modern History},
  year={1968},
  volume={40},
  pages={156 - 165}
}

• G. Rothenberg
• Published 1 June 1968
• History
• The Journal of Modern History

The fall of Napoleon ushered in a period of comparative stability in Europe based primarily on the new balance of power established by the treaties of 1815 and the rigorous suppression of all domestic disorders. Preservation of this state of affairs fell in large part to Austria, which had emerged from the French wars with great prestige and additional power. Its ruling circles, and above all its chancellor and chief minister, Klemens Prince Metternich, were determined to defend the newly restored order against all radical innovators, foreign and domestic. To accomplish this, Metternich relied both on diplomacy and armed force. But while the first aspect of his system has been examined and reexamined by historians, the second has been strangely neglected.' Therefore, it is the purpose of this article to briefly survey the character and role of the Austrian army during the age of Metternich. From 1815 to 1848 the primary tasks of the k.k. Austrian army were the maintenance of the international status of 1815 and the protection of internal tranquility. To perform these missions, the empire, now comprising some thirty million inhabitants, maintained an impressive military establishment, numbering, on paper at least, nearly four hundred thousand men. However, behind this imposing facade there existed severe shortcomings in finances, administration, personnel, and training. In addition, the sturdy political conservatism of Austria's rulers was matched by an equal hostility to military innovations, an attitude which tended to impede military efficiency. Basically, many of the defects could be traced to the impoverished condition of the state. The strain of the French wars had left the empire financially exhausted, burdened with a heavy public debt and a mass of depreciated paper money. Financial recovery was impeded by complicated and sometimes contradictory economic regulations and by an inefficient system of taxation. Under these circumstances there was considerable pressure to reduce military expenditures. As early as the summer of 1814, General Josef Count Radetzky, then chief of staff to Field-Marshal Karl Prince of Schwarzenberg, commander in chief of the allied armies, had protested to Emperor Francis that the k.k.