The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War

  title={The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War},
  author={Bahar Levento and Branislav L. Slantchev},
  journal={American Journal of Political Science},
According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large rapid shift of power renders unbelievable a rising state's promise to compensate its declin- ing opponent, causing the latter to attack preventively. This mechanism does not provide a complete and coherent explanation of war because it does not specify how inefficient fighting resolves this commitment problem. We present a complete information model of war as a sequence of battles and show that although opportunities… Expand
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