The Architecture and Governance of Financial Supervision: Sources and Implications†

  title={The Architecture and Governance of Financial Supervision: Sources and Implications†},
  author={Nazire Nergiz Dincer and Barry Eichengreen},
  journal={International Finance},
We compare the architecture and governance of financial supervision across countries. We find that countries where the supervisor is the central bank, or where it is independent of government, have more conservatively regulated financial systems. Nonperforming loans are lower in countries where the supervisor is independent, while capital ratios are higher where the central bank, rather than another agency of government, is the lead supervisor. At the same time, some measures of bank credit to… Expand

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