The Approval Mechanism Experiment: A Solution to Prisoner's Dilemma †

@inproceedings{Saijo2011TheAM,
  title={The Approval Mechanism Experiment: A Solution to Prisoner's Dilemma †},
  author={Tatsuyoshi Saijo and Yoshitaka Okano and Takafumi Yamakawa},
  year={2011}
}
Players can approve or reject the other choice of the strategy after announcing the choices in a prisoner’s dilemma game. If both approve the other choice, the outcome is what they choose, and if either one rejects the other choice, it is the outcome when both defect, which is called the mate choice mechanism. The Nash equilibria (NE) and subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of this two stage game have all possible combinations of cooperation and defection. However, the outcome of neutrally stable… CONTINUE READING

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