The Antitrust Prohibition of Excessive Pricing

David Gilo; Y. Spiegel

DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3342766

Corpus ID: 219363239

The Antitrust Prohibition of Excessive Pricing

@article{Gilo2019TheAP,
  title={The Antitrust Prohibition of Excessive Pricing},
  author={David Gilo and Y. Spiegel},
  journal={Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal},
  year={2019}
}

David Gilo, Y. Spiegel
Published 2019
Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy eJournal

Excessive pricing by a dominant firm is unlawful in many countries. To assess whether it is excessive, the dominant firm’s price is often compared with price benchmarks. We examine the competitive implications of two such benchmarks: a retrospective benchmark where the price that prevails after a rival enters the market is used to assess whether the dominant firm’s pre-entry price was excessive, and a contemporaneous benchmark, where the dominant firm’s price is compared with the price that the… Expand

View on SSRN