The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic

  title={The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic},
  author={Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich},
  journal={Psychological Science},
  pages={311 - 318}
One way to make judgments under uncertainty is to anchor on information that comes to mind and adjust until a plausible estimate is reached. This anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic is assumed to underlie many intuitive judgments, and insufficient adjustment is commonly invoked to explain judgmental biases. However, despite extensive research on anchoring effects, evidence for adjustment-based anchoring biases has only recently been provided, and the causes of insufficient adjustment remain… 

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