# The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money

@article{Giannakopoulos2016TheAO, title={The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money}, author={Yiannis Giannakopoulos and E. Koutsoupias and Maria Kyropoulou}, journal={ArXiv}, year={2016}, volume={abs/1607.03688} }

We consider the scheduling problem on n strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias 2014] where a machine is bound by her declarations in the sense that if she is assigned a particular job then she will have to execute it for an amount of time at least equal to the one she reported, even if her private, true processing capabilities are actually faster. We provide a (non-truthful… CONTINUE READING

8 Citations

Truthfulness on a budget: trading money for approximation through monitoring

- Computer Science
- 2019

- 2
- PDF

#### References

##### Publications referenced by this paper.

SHOWING 1-10 OF 37 REFERENCES

The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation

- Computer Science, Mathematics
- 2004

- 758
- PDF

Mechanism design for fractional scheduling on unrelated machines

- Computer Science, Mathematics
- 2010

- 46
- PDF

Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming

- Computer Science, Mathematics
- 2005

- 268
- PDF