The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money

  title={The Anarchy of Scheduling Without Money},
  author={Yiannis Giannakopoulos and E. Koutsoupias and Maria Kyropoulou},
  • Yiannis Giannakopoulos, E. Koutsoupias, Maria Kyropoulou
  • Published 2016
  • Computer Science, Mathematics
  • ArXiv
  • We consider the scheduling problem on n strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias 2014] where a machine is bound by her declarations in the sense that if she is assigned a particular job then she will have to execute it for an amount of time at least equal to the one she reported, even if her private, true processing capabilities are actually faster. We provide a (non-truthful… CONTINUE READING

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