The Agent-Based Double Auction Markets: 15 Years On

  title={The Agent-Based Double Auction Markets: 15 Years On},
  author={Shu-Heng Chen and Chung-Ching Tai},
Novelties discovering as a source of constant change is the essence of economics. However, most economic models do not have the kind of novelties-discovering agents required for constant changes. This silence was broken by Andrews and Prager 15 years ago when they placed GP (genetic programming)-driven agents in the double auction market. The work was, however, neither economically well interpreted nor complete; hence the silence remains in economics. In this article, we revisit their model and… 

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