The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly

  title={The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly},
  author={Edmund J. Malesky and Paul Schuler and Anh Tuan Tran},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={762 - 786}
An influential literature has demonstrated that legislative transparency can improve the performance of parliamentarians in democracies. In a democracy, the incentive for improved performance is created by voters’ responses to newly available information. Building on this work, donor projects have begun to export transparency interventions to authoritarian regimes under the assumption that nongovernmental organizations and the media can substitute for the incentives created by voters. Such… 
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