The Acquisition of Fisher Body By General Motors*

@article{Coase2000TheAO,
  title={The Acquisition of Fisher Body By General Motors*},
  author={Ronald H. Coase},
  journal={The Journal of Law and Economics},
  year={2000},
  volume={43},
  pages={15 - 32}
}
  • R. Coase
  • Published 1 April 2000
  • Environmental Science, History
  • The Journal of Law and Economics
It is commonly said that in 1926 General Motors was led to acquire its supplier of automobile bodies, Fisher Body, because Fisher Body held up General Motors. It is claimed that Fisher Body did this by locating its body plants far away from the General Motors assembly plants and by adapting inefficient methods of production, thus increasing both the cost of producing bidies and the profits of Fisher Body under its cost‐plus contract. This tale is factually incorrect. What General Motors… 
The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body-General Motors
The Fisher Body-General Motors case illustrates the costs of using inherently imperfect long-term contracts to solve potential holdup problems, and therefore the advantages of vertical integration.
The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body–General Motors
Abstract The Fisher Body–General Motors case illustrates the costs of using inherently imperfect long‐term contracts to solve potential holdup problems, and therefore the advantages of vertical
Fisher—General Motors and the Nature of the Firm*
  • B. Klein
  • Environmental Science
    The Journal of Law and Economics
  • 2000
After working well for more than 5 years, the Fisher Body—General Motors (GM) contract for the supply of automobile bodies broke down when GM's demand for Fisher's bodies unexpectedly increased
Asset Specificity and Holdups
Specific assets are assets that have a significantly higher value within a particular transacting relationship than outside the relationship. To illustrate, consider the classic Fisher Body-General
Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited*
  • R. Freeland
  • Environmental Science
    The Journal of Law and Economics
  • 2000
General Motors's (GM's) 1926 acquisition of Fisher Body has long served as a cornerstone of hold‐up arguments for vertical integration. This paper utilizes primary historical evidence to make three
Firm development as an integrated process: with evidence from the General Motors–Fisher Body case
This paper argues that an adequate approach to the firm should be able to accommodate the complexities of actual firm development. The latter is conceptualized in terms of three general stages: prime
Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel? The GM-Fisher Body Contract
In the analysis of vertical integration by contract versus ownership one event has dominated the discussion - General Motors' merger with Fisher Body in 1926. The debates have all been premised on
Fisher Body revisited: Supply contracts and vertical integration
The vertical integration of Fisher Body by General Motors has been a leading example in both the transaction-cost theory and the property-rights theory of the firm. The present paper makes the
A Comprehensive Study on Fisher-General Motor: Outside Option and Hold-up Problem
By introduction of effective outside options, the article analyzed classical Fisher-GM on a new perspective, and concluded: in the contract of Fisher-GM, because of a better mechanism design, Fisher
The Schumpeterian shock at General Motors in the 1920’s
  • S. Norton
  • Economics, Business
    Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy
  • 2018
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between Joseph Schumpeter’s economics and the rise of General Motors (GM). Design/methodology/approach The paper uses regression analysis
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  • R. Freeland
  • Environmental Science
    The Journal of Law and Economics
  • 2000
General Motors's (GM's) 1926 acquisition of Fisher Body has long served as a cornerstone of hold‐up arguments for vertical integration. This paper utilizes primary historical evidence to make three
My years with General Motors
When Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. joined General Motors in 1918, it was a sprawling, loosely organized company heading toward severe financial and management crises. Two years later, after the resignation of
Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited
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