The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go

  title={The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go},
  author={Thomas Sturm},
  pages={66 - 81}
  • T. Sturm
  • Published 18 January 2012
  • Psychology
  • Inquiry
Abstract Current psychology of human reasoning is divided into several different approaches. For instance, there is a major dispute over the question whether human beings are able to apply norms of the formal models of rationality such as rules of logic, or probability and decision theory, correctly. While researchers following the “heuristics and biases” approach argue that we deviate systematically from these norms, and so are perhaps deeply irrational, defenders of the “bounded rationality… Expand
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