The $N$ -Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics

@article{Abbass2016The,
  title={The  \$N\$ -Player Trust Game and its Replicator Dynamics},
  author={Hussein A. Abbass and Garrison W. Greenwood and Eleni Petraki},
  journal={IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation},
  year={2016},
  volume={20},
  pages={470-474}
}
Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psychological concept, the concept has not gained much attention from evolutionary game theorists. In this letter, an N-player trust-based social dilemma game is introduced. While the theory shows that a society with no untrustworthy individuals would yield maximum wealth to both the society as a whole and the individuals in the… 

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