The "New" Hugo Black & the Warren Court

@article{Atkins1986TheH,
  title={The "New" Hugo Black \& the Warren Court},
  author={Burton M. Atkins and Terry Sloope},
  journal={Polity},
  year={1986},
  volume={18},
  pages={621 - 637}
}
Much has been said in the political science and law literature over whether or not Justice Hugo Black remained consistent in his voting behavior during his last several years on the Supreme Court. The debate focuses on Black's behavior during the 1960's and on whether his declining support, during that time, for civil liberties and civil rights is in fact only the apparent effect of the Court itself having become much more liberal. In this article Professor Atkins and Mr. Sloope test several… 

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