Corpus ID: 237513889

Tests of Bayesian Rationality

@inproceedings{Molavi2021TestsOB,
  title={Tests of Bayesian Rationality},
  author={Pooya Molavi},
  year={2021}
}
What are the testable restrictions imposed on the dynamics of an agent’s belief by the hypothesis of Bayesian rationality, which do not rely on the additional assumption that the agent has an objectively correct prior? In this paper, I argue that there are essentially no such restrictions. I consider an agent who chooses a sequence of actions and an econometrician who observes the agent’s actions but not her signals and is interested in testing the hypothesis that the agent is Bayesian. I argue… Expand

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