Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment

@article{Dionne2001TestingFE,
  title={Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment},
  author={G. Dionne and C. Gouri{\'e}roux and C. Vanasse},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={2001},
  volume={109},
  pages={444 - 453}
}
We analyze jointly the distribution of automobile accidents and the choice of deductible. One prediction in the literature is that high risk individuals will choose small deductibles within risk classes, when there is asymmetrical information. We show, however, that risk classification is sufficient, in the sense that there is no residual adverse selection on risk types in the automobile insurance portfolio studied. 
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