Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving

@article{DellaVigna2012TestingFA,
  title={Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving},
  author={Stefano DellaVigna and John A. List and Ulrike Malmendier},
  journal={Microeconomics: Welfare Economics \& Collective Decision-Making eJournal},
  year={2012}
}
Every year, 90% of Americans give money to charities. Is such generosity necessarily welfare enhancing for the giver? We present a theoretical framework that distinguishes two types of motivation: individuals like to give, for example, due to altruism or warm glow, and individuals would rather not give but dislike saying no, for example, due to social pressure. We design a door-to-door fund-raiser in which some households are informed about the exact time of solicitation with a flyer on their… 
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