Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping

@article{Shaban1987TestingBC,
  title={Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping},
  author={Radwan Ali Shaban},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={1987},
  volume={95},
  pages={893 - 920}
}
  • R. A. Shaban
  • Published 1 October 1987
  • Economics
  • Journal of Political Economy
The "Marshallian" approach assumes a prohibitively hight cost of monitor ing the sharecropper's activities while the "monitoring" approach a rgues that landlords stipulate and effectively monitor sharecroppers' activities. The author presents new evidence using detailed data col lected from eight Indian villages. Most tenants own some land of thei r own; this provides a controlled environment in studying the impact of contractual arrangements. The differences in input and output inte nsities on… 
Sharecropping, Insecure Land Rights and Land Titling Policies: A Case Study of Lac Alaotra, Madagascar
Sharecropping between poor landlords and rich tenants has hitherto been the subject of very little academic scrutiny. Given that such 'reverse share tenancy' contracts are mostly at odds with the
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We conducted a survey of farming households in West-Champaran district of Bihar, to check for difference in the input and output intensities across owned and leased-in plots. No significant
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Abstract A century ago, Alfred Marshall demonstrated the inefficiency associated with farmers receiving only a portion of their marginal product. Farmers will supply less labor than under
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Although a large theoretical literature discusses the possible inefficiency of sharecropping contracts, empirical evidence on this phenomenon has been ambiguous at best. Household‐level fixed‐effect
Does Sharecropping Affect Productivity and Long-Term Investment? Evidence from West Bengal's Tenancy Reforms
Although transfer of agricultural land ownership through land reform had positive impacts on productivity, investment, and political empowerment in many cases, institutional arrangements in West
Different input intensities on owned and sharecropped plots : The consequences of imperfect monitoring , cost sharing , and endogenous crop choice
In this paper, we reconsider the question whether there is incidence for the so-called Marhallian inefficiency in real world sharecropping contracts or not. By extending the well known method of
Sharecropping in Theory and Practice: A Selective Review
Sharecropping has remained a dominant agrarian institution around the world. There is a large, and growing, literature that has studied this institution from both theoretical and empirical points of
Sharecropping contracts in rural India: A note
Abstract In this article we examine the terms of sharecropping contracts using data from rural India. We examine the effect of - (1) the sharing of input costs between landlord and tenant; (2) the
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