Testing Social Preferences Through Differential Attention to Own and Partner’s Payoff in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

@inproceedings{Tanida2010TestingSP,
  title={Testing Social Preferences Through Differential Attention to Own and Partner’s Payoff in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game},
  author={Shigehito Tanida and Toshio Yamagishi},
  year={2010}
}
Normal 0 0 2 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE Cooperation in one-shot public good games, where future returns are unavailable, is observed in numerous experimental studies. Economists and psychologists explain such behavior as a reflection of social preferences—utilities deriving from payoffs to others as well as to themselves. We tested validity of this explanation by measuring how long cooperators and defectors looked at payoffs to themselves and to the partner with an eye tracking device… CONTINUE READING

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