Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale

  title={Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale},
  author={Sungsu Kim},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={606 - 610}
  • Sungsu Kim
  • Published 1 December 2002
  • Psychology, Philosophy, Biology
  • Philosophy of Science
Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide… 

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