Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India

@inproceedings{Rao1999TerrorAA,
  title={Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India},
  author={V. Rao and F. Bloch},
  year={1999}
}
  • V. Rao, F. Bloch
  • Published 1999
  • Economics
  • The authors examine how domestic violence may be used as a bargaining instrument, to extract larger dowries from a spouse's family. The phrase"dowry violence"refers not to the paid at the time of the wedding, but to additional payments demanded by the groom's family after the marriage. The additional dowry is often paid to stop the husband from systematically beating the wife. The authors base their case study of three villages in southern India on qualitative and survey data. Based on the… CONTINUE READING
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