Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action

  title={Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action},
  author={Gy{\"o}rgy Gergely and Gergely Csibra},
  journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},

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  • G. Csibra
  • Psychology
    Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
  • 2003
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