• Corpus ID: 239998324

Teardown and feasibility study of IronKey - the most secure USB Flash drive

  title={Teardown and feasibility study of IronKey - the most secure USB Flash drive},
  author={Sergei P. Skorobogatov},
There are many solutions for protecting user data on USB Flash drives. However, the family of IronKey devices was designed with the highest security expectations. They are definitely standing above others by being certified to FIPS 1402 Level 3 and also claimed as certified by NATO for Top-Secret use. Many encrypted USB drives had been evaluated and found insecure, however, no public research on IronKey devices was made. This feasibility study fills the gap by looking inside the IronKey family… 

Compromising device security via NVM controller vulnerability

  • S. Skorobogatov
  • Computer Science
    2020 IEEE Physical Assurance and Inspection of Electronics (PAINE)
  • 2020
A new vulnerability found in a low-cost secure authentication IC that stores its security settings in non-volatile memory is introduced, which could potentially be used to change the security settings of a device in a way that bypasses the intended state machine controlling access and allow reverting the stored hardware security level back to the factory test/debug mode.

Is Hardware Security Prepared for Unexpected Discoveries?

  • S. Skorobogatov
  • Computer Science
    2018 IEEE International Symposium on the Physical and Failure Analysis of Integrated Circuits (IPFA)
  • 2018
The history of similar discoveries in different areas is looked at, some results on memory extraction from an old smartcard and approaching highly secure embedded memory - battery-backed SRAM are given and possible discoveries in attacks aimed at stored information are elaborated.

Flash Memory 'Bumping' Attacks

This paper evaluates memory verification and AES authentication schemes used in secure microcontrollers and a highly secure FPGA and finds that the search space can be reduced from infeasible > 2100 to affordable ≈ 215 guesses per block of data.

Breakthrough Silicon Scanning Discovers Backdoor in Military Chip

Using an innovative patented technique, Pipeline Emission Analysis (PEA) was able to extract the secret key to activate the backdoor, as well as other security keys such as the AES and the Passkey, which means the device is wide open to intellectual property (IP) theft, fraud, re-programming, and reverse engineering of the design.

The bumpy road towards iPhone 5c NAND mirroring

It is shown that claims that iPhone 5c NAND mirroring was infeasible were ill-advised and the process can be improved, it is still a successful proof-of-concept project.

Hardware Security Evaluation of MAX 10 FPGA

This paper shows preliminary evaluation of hardware security in Intel MAX 10 devices, one of the most suitable candidates for applications demanding extensive features and high level of security.

Security requirements for cryptographic modules

A security model is described for different levels of cryptographic modules in different environments, designed after defining threats, and comprises of security levels, threat levels, cryptographically secure and approved algorithm requirements.

Optical Fault Induction Attacks

A technology to block a new class of attacks on secure microcontrollers and smartcards whereby a logical 1 or 0 is not encoded by a high or low voltage on a single line, but by (HL or (LH) on a pair of lines.

Design Principles for Tamper-Resistant Smartcard Processors

We describe techniques for extracting protected software and data from smartcard processors. This includes manual microprobing, laser cutting, focused ion-beam manipulation, glitch attacks, and power

Reverse Engineering Flash EEPROM Memories Using Scanning Electron Microscopy

The presented fast, efficient and low cost technique is successfully implemented on 0.35μm technology node microcontrollers and on a 0.21μm smart card type integrated circuit.