Teaching to the Rating : School Accountability and the Distribution of Student Achievement

@inproceedings{Reback2007TeachingTT,
  title={Teaching to the Rating : School Accountability and the Distribution of Student Achievement},
  author={Randall Reback},
  year={2007}
}
This paper examines whether minimum competency school accountability systems, such as those created under No Child Left Behind, influence the distribution of student achievement. Because school ratings in these systems only incorporate students’ test scores via pass rates, this type of system increases incentives for schools to improve the performance of students who are on the margin of passing but does not increase short-run incentives for schools to improve other students’ performance. Using… CONTINUE READING

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