• Corpus ID: 16029874

Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from India Author ( s ) :

  title={Teacher Performance Pay : Experimental Evidence from India Author ( s ) :},
  author={K. Muralidharan and Venkatesh Sundararaman},
Incentivos salariales para el profesorado vinculados con el rendimiento de los estudiantes: análisis y propuestas, considerando el modelo catalán
espanolLos incentivos salariales en el ambito del profesorado no universitario, especialmente los vinculados al rendimiento de los estudiantes, son objeto de debate desde hace unos anos.


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