Corpus ID: 197467065

Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance∗

@inproceedings{Alstadster2018TaxEA,
  title={Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance∗},
  author={Alstads{\ae}ter and Zucman},
  year={2018}
}
Exploiting rich administrative data and salient policy variation, we study the substitution between illegal tax evasion and legal tax avoidance. By increasing its enforcement effort, the Norwegian government pushed many wealthy individuals to disclose assets previously hidden abroad. We find that the taxes paid by these individuals rise 30% at the time of disclosure and that the rise is sustained over time. After stopping to evade, taxpayers do not start avoiding more. Our results suggest that… Expand
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