Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation

@inproceedings{Waldinger2021TargetingIT,
  title={Targeting In-Kind Transfers through Market Design: A Revealed Preference Analysis of Public Housing Allocation},
  author={Daniel C Waldinger},
  year={2021}
}
In-kind transfer programs aim to provide valuable resources to beneficiaries while targeting those who most need assistance. This problem is particularly challenging for public housing authorities (PHAs), which allocate apartments to applicants who may differ in their outside options as well as their preferred apartment types. PHAs in the U.S. differ widely in the priority systems they use and how much choice they give potential tenants over where to live. This paper evaluates how these choice… 
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