TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation

@article{Milinski1987TITFT,
  title={TIT FOR TAT in sticklebacks and the evolution of cooperation},
  author={M. Milinski},
  journal={Nature},
  year={1987},
  volume={325},
  pages={433-435}
}
The problems of achieving mutual cooperation can be formalized in a game called the Prisoner's Dilemma in which selfish defection is always more rewarding than cooperation1. If the two protagonists have a certain minimum probability of meeting again a strategy called TIT FOR TAT is very successful2. In TIT FOR TAT the player cooperates on the first move and thereafter does whatever the opponent did on the previous move. I have studied the behaviour of fish when confronting a potential predator… Expand
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