THE LOTTERY PARADOX AND OUR EPISTEMIC GOAL

@article{Douven2008THELP,
  title={THE LOTTERY PARADOX AND OUR EPISTEMIC GOAL},
  author={I. Douven},
  journal={Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  year={2008},
  volume={89},
  pages={204-225}
}
  • I. Douven
  • Published 2008
  • Economics
  • Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
: Many have the intuition that the right response to the Lottery Paradox is to deny that one can justifiably believe of even a single lottery ticket that it will lose. The paper shows that from any theory of justification that solves the paradox in accordance with this intuition, a theory not of that kind can be derived that also solves the paradox but is more conducive to our epistemic goal than the former. It is argued that currently there is no valid reason not to give preference to the… Expand
28 Citations
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