author={Graham Priest},
In early Buddhist logic, it was standard to assume that for any state of affairs there were four possibilities: that it held, that it did not, both, or neither. This is the catuskoti (or tetralemma). Classical logicians have had a hard time making sense of this, but it makes perfectly good sense in the semantics of various paraconsistent logics, such as First Degree Entailment. Matters are more complicated for later Buddhist thinkers, such as Nagarjuna, who appear to suggest that none of these… 
Four Corners - East and West
In early Buddhist logic, it was standard to assume that for any state of affairs there were four possibilities: that it held, that it did not, both, or neither, which makes perfectly good sense in the semantics of various paraconsistent logics.
None of the Above: The Catuṣkoṭi in Indian Buddhist Logic
The catuṣkoṭi (Greek: tetralemma; English: four corners) is a venerable principle of Indian logic, which has been central to important aspects of reasoning in the Buddhist tradition. What, exactly,
A Note on a Modified Catuskoti
The `catuskoti' or tetralemma in Buddhist logic is a problematic subject from the modern logical point of view. Recently a many-valued paraconsistent logic was proposed in order to formalize
A computational interpretation of conceptivism
This paper examines a number of prima facie unrelated deductive contexts in which Addition fails and attempts to harmonise them by developing a computational interpretation of conceptivist logics.
How We Think Mādhyamikas Think: A Response To Tom Tillemans
Tillemans argues, centrally, that the paradoxes of emptiness that we take to be found in Nāgārjuna are best interpreted in a consistent fashion. In our response we take issue with this, arguing that
Semantical analysis of weak Kleene logics
A semantical analysis of the Weak Kleene Logics and from the tradition of Bochvar and Halldén establishes a characterisation result for the relation of logical consequence in and individuate necessary and sufficient conditions for a set Δ of formulas to follow from a set Γ in.
Prima facie, MMK (18:8) on the left, and Wúmén Guān (18) (Ch. 無門關) on the right don’t have a lot in common—but they do.1 Both are, and this is the main hypothesis of this essay, a schema for upāya
Priest on Negation
What conception of negation a dialetheist might have, in holding that a statement and its negation can both be true, has been the subject to considerable debate. Several of the issues in play in this
Recapture, Transparency, Negation and a Logic for the Catuṣkoṭi
  • Adrian Kreutz
  • Philosophy
    Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy
  • 2019
The recent literature on Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭi centres around Jay Garfield’s (2009) and Graham Priest’s (2010) interpretation. It is an open discussion to what extent their interpretation is an
Predicates, parts, and impermanence: a contemporary version of some central Buddhist tenets
Abstract In this article, I argue that recent work in analytic philosophy on the semantics of names and the metaphysics of persistence supports two theses in Buddhist philosophy, namely the


Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought
Nagarjuna seems willing to embrace contradictions while at the same time making use of classic reductio arguments. He asserts that he rejects all philosophical views including his own-that he asserts
Paraconsistent logics
This chapter discusses the need to derive reasonable inferences without deriving the trivial inferences that follow the ex falso quodlibet proof rule that holds in classical logic.
Some Logical Aspects of Nagarjuna's System
THE MADHYAMIKA SCHOOL, founded by NSigrjuna (2nd century A.D. ), has been known to modern scholarship since the time of Emile Burnouf, over a century ago. During the past six decades, it has been
Doubt truth to be a liar
I. TRUTH 1. Aristotle on the Law of Non-Contradiction 2. Theories of Truth 3. Trivialism II. NEGATION 4. Contradiction 5. Boolean Negation 6. Denial and Rejection III. RATIONALITY 7. Rational Belief
Nāgārjuna's appeal
Deux caracteristiques de la philosophie de Nāgārjuna ont retenu l'attention de l'A. Ses ecrits philosophiques ont fascine un grand nombre de savants ce qui demande des explications. Dans un second
A Source Book in Indian Philosophy
Here are the chief riches of more than 3,000 years of Indian philosophical thought-the ancient Vedas, the Upanisads, the epics, the treatises of the heterodox and orthodox systems, the commentaries
What is so bad about contradictions
Soulevant la question de savoir ce qui pose probleme dans le fait de croire en des contradictions, telles que l'argument du menteur est vrai et l'argument du menteur est faux, l'A. analyse les
Paraconsistent Logic”, pp
  • Handbook of Philosophical Logic (second edition),
  • 2002
Is Buddhist Logic Non-classical or Deviant?”, ch. 9 of Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmak ı̄rti and his Tibetan Successors (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications)
  • 1999
Mountains Are Just Mountains