THE EFFECTS OF RINGLEADER DISCRIMINATION ON CARTEL STABILITY AND DETERRENCE – EXPERIMENTAL INSIGHTS

@inproceedings{Hesch2012THEEO,
  title={THE EFFECTS OF RINGLEADER DISCRIMINATION ON CARTEL STABILITY AND DETERRENCE – EXPERIMENTAL INSIGHTS},
  author={Michael Hesch},
  year={2012}
}
Cartel ringleaders make significant contributions to enabling illegal collusive agreements to function. According to US legislation, ringleaders are excluded from corporate leniency programs. Since 2002, under EU regulations, ringleaders may qualify for a reduction of fines. To date, both antitrust laws treat cartel ringleaders differently. We analyze the impact of this difference in a cartel experiment. Given a low probability of detection through an authority, we find that excluding… CONTINUE READING

Citations

Publications citing this paper.

Do Leniency Policies Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence

VIEW 4 EXCERPTS
CITES METHODS & BACKGROUND
HIGHLY INFLUENCED