• Corpus ID: 18711385

THE ECONOMICS OF MATCHING : STABILITY AND INCENTIVES * t

@inproceedings{Roth2007THEEO,
  title={THE ECONOMICS OF MATCHING : STABILITY AND INCENTIVES * t},
  author={Alvin E. Roth},
  year={2007}
}
eecs.harvard.edu
2 Citations
Highly Influential Citations
1
Background Citations
2

2 Citations

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We study two-sided matching markets among workers and firms. Workers seek one position at a firm but firms may employ several workers. In many applications those markets are monotonic: leaving…
Preferences: modelling frameworks, reasoning tools, and multi-agent scenarios
TLDR
Constraint programming offers natural modelling frameworks, efficient solvers, and many application domains including scheduling, timetabling, resource allocation, vehicle routing, and more.

References

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We shall assume that the objectives of a society are embodied in a certain social choice rule. A social choice rule (SCR) selects a set of feasible social states for each possible configuration of…
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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It has been conjectured that no system of voting can preclude strategic voting-the securing by a voter of an outcome he prefers through misrepresentation of his preferences. In this paper, for all…
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
TLDR
The object here is to prove that the algorithm for assigning students to universities gives each student the best university available in a stable system of assignments.
Competitive Exchange
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On Strategy Proofness and Social Welfare Functions When Preferences are Restricted
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On Arrow Social Welfare Functions and on Nonmanipulable and Noncorruptible Social Choice Functions
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