author={John F. Nash},
  journal={Classics in Game Theory},
  • J. Nash
  • Published 1 April 1950
  • Economics
  • Classics in Game Theory
A new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc. It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game. In this treatment a few general assumptions are made concerning the behavior of a single individual and of a group of two individuals in certain economic environments. From these, the solution (in the sense of this paper) of classical problem may be obtained. In the terms of game theory, values are found… 

Figures from this paper

Theory of Bargaining Process: A Game Theoretical Approach
Based on bargaining problems in the form that J. Nash originally formulated, a two-person bargaining process is modelled as an infinite game in extensive form. In this game, both bargainers make
A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
The bargaining model I propose to discuss in this paper2 is a simplified and, as I hope, improved version of my bargaining model published in the Princeton Contributions (see [3]). Like my earlier
Cooperative Games in Strategic Form
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the "proposer commitment" procedure, is
A General Dynamic Model of Bargaining — The Perfect Information Case
Nash (1950, 1953) isolated a particular cooperative solution for bargaining, first by axiomatization, and then by identifying it with an equilibrium of a noncooperative game. Regarding the latter
Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games
In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is
A solution for two-person bargaining problems
Everyday bargaining problems are often solved by tossing a coin. A solution for two-person bargaining problems is axiomatized, which is a Pareto-optimal generalization of this coin tossing method.
Multilateral Bargaining Problems
Abstract In many situations in economics and political science there are gains from forming coalitions but conflict over which coalition to form and how to distribute the gains. This paper presents
A bargaining approach to coordination in networks
A novel contribution of this paper is that the fraction of the cost borne by each player involved in a bilateral link is not fixed exogenously, but results from bargaining.
Replication invariance of bargaining solutions
This note is concerned with the behavior of bargaining solutions under replication of bargaining problems. A notion of replication, alternative to that studied by Kalai, is proposed, and it is shown