author={John F. Nash},
  journal={Classics in Game Theory},
  • J. Nash
  • Published 1 April 1950
  • Economics
  • Classics in Game Theory
A new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc. It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game. In this treatment a few general assumptions are made concerning the behavior of a single individual and of a group of two individuals in certain economic environments. From these, the solution (in the sense of this paper) of classical problem may be obtained. In the terms of game theory, values are found… 

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