Corpus ID: 32765052

THE ABILITY OF AN ABSOLUTE KING TO BORROW DURING THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURY . SPAIN DURING THE HABSBURG DINASTY

@inproceedings{Nogal2002THEAO,
  title={THE ABILITY OF AN ABSOLUTE KING TO BORROW DURING THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURY . SPAIN DURING THE HABSBURG DINASTY},
  author={Carlos Alvarez Nogal},
  year={2002}
}
The Spanish Monarchy borrowed foreign credit during more than 150 years despite repudiating its agreements from time to time. This paper explores why the prospect of future repudiations was not an obstacle for lenders to keep offering credit to such a risky sovereign. According to the extant literature on sovereign debt, lenders should not have lent any money to the Spanish Monarchy, especially because they were not organized as a cartel. Sovereign debt theory asserts that the principal… Expand

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