Sympathy and subjectivity

  title={Sympathy and subjectivity},
  author={Peter Carruthers},
  journal={Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
  • P. Carruthers
  • Published 1 December 1999
  • Philosophy
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
This paper shows that even if the mental states of non-human animals lack phenomenological properties, as some accounts of mental-state consciousness imply, this need not prevent those states from being appropriate objects of sympathy and moral concern. The paper argues that the most basic form of mental (as opposed to biological) harm lies in the existence of thwarted agency, or thwarted desire, rather than in anything phenomenological. 
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