Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design

@inproceedings{Daskalakis2012SymmetriesAO,
  title={Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design},
  author={Constantinos Daskalakis and S. Matthew Weinberg},
  booktitle={EC},
  year={2012}
}
We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent additive bidders with arbitrary demands when either the number of bidders is held constant or the number of items is held constant. In the first setting, we need that each bidder's values for the items are sampled from a possibly correlated, item-symmetric distribution, allowing different distributions for each bidder. In the second setting, we allow the values of each bidder for the items to be… CONTINUE READING

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