Sybil-Resistant Mixing for Bitcoin

  title={Sybil-Resistant Mixing for Bitcoin},
  author={George Dean Bissias and A. Pinar Ozisik and Brian Neil Levine and Marc Liberatore},
  journal={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society},
A fundamental limitation of Bitcoin and its variants is that the movement of coin between addresses can be observed by examining the public block chain. This record enables adversaries to link addresses to individuals, and to identify multiple addresses as belonging to a single participant. Users can try to hide this information by mixing, where a participant exchanges the funds in an address coin-for-coin with another participant and address. In this paper, we describe the weaknesses of extant… 

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