Swing and a myth: a review of Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter

  title={Swing and a myth: a review of Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter},
  author={Loren E. Lomasky},
  journal={Public Choice},
  • L. Lomasky
  • Published 11 January 2008
  • Political Science
  • Public Choice
'Anyone who hates children and dogs," WC. Fields declared, "can't be all bad." Surely the bibulous iconoclast would have warmly received Bryan Caplan's The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (Caplan 2006). Democracy has become such a sacred cow for us that nothing, not even its avowed embrace by George W Bush, will lead people to voice suspicions. Caplan, however, is a conspicuous exception. Democracies, he tells us in the subtitle, choose bad policies, and they do… 
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