Swap Stability in Schelling Games on Graphs

@inproceedings{Agarwal2020SwapSI,
  title={Swap Stability in Schelling Games on Graphs},
  author={Aishwarya Agarwal and Edith Elkind and Jiarui Gan and Alexandros A. Voudouris},
  booktitle={AAAI},
  year={2020}
}
We study a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model. These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into multiple types; each agent either occupies a node of the graph and never moves away or aims to maximize the fraction of her neighbors who are of her own type. We consider a variant of this model that we call swap Schelling games, where the number of agents is equal… Expand
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