Survival of Dominated Strategies under Evolutionary Dynamics ∗

  title={Survival of Dominated Strategies under Evolutionary Dynamics ∗},
  author={Josef Hofbauer and William H. Sandholm},
We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements does not eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small. 
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