Super Tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections

  title={Super Tuesday: campaign finance and the dynamics of sequential elections},
  author={Rainer Schwabe},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  • R. Schwabe
  • Published 1 April 2015
  • Economics
  • Social Choice and Welfare
I develop a model of campaign finance in primary elections in which campaigns, which supply hard information about candidates’ electability, must be financed by strategic donors. I provide a rationale for Super Tuesday electoral calendars in which a block of voters vote simultaneously early in the election followed by other voters voting sequentially. For a range of campaign costs, such a calendar maximizes expected donations to nomination campaigns and, thus, the ex-ante probability of… 

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