Suckers or saviors? Consistent contributors in social dilemmas.

  title={Suckers or saviors? Consistent contributors in social dilemmas.},
  author={Jonathan Weber and J. Keith Murnighan},
  journal={Journal of personality and social psychology},
  volume={95 6},
Groups and organizations face a fundamental problem: They need cooperation but their members have incentives to free ride. Empirical research on this problem has often been discouraging, and economic models suggest that solutions are unlikely or unstable. In contrast, the authors present a model and 4 studies that show that an unwaveringly consistent contributor can effectively catalyze cooperation in social dilemmas. The studies indicate that consistent contributors occur naturally, and their… 

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