• Corpus ID: 238259113

Sublinear Approximation Algorithm for Nash Social Welfare with XOS Valuations

  title={Sublinear Approximation Algorithm for Nash Social Welfare with XOS Valuations},
  author={Siddharth Barman and Anand Krishna and Pooja Kulkarni and Shivika Narang},
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among n agents with the objective of maximizing Nash social welfare (NSW). This welfare function is defined as the geometric mean of the agents’ valuations and, hence, it strikes a balance between the extremes of social welfare (arithmetic mean) and egalitarian welfare (max-min value). Nash social welfare has been extensively studied in recent years for various valuation classes. In particular, a notable negative result is known when the… 

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  • U. Feige
  • Economics, Mathematics
    STOC '06
  • 2006
A way of rounding any fractional solution to a linear programming relaxation to solve the problem of maximizing welfare so as to give a feasible solution of welfare at least half that of the value of the fractional Solution.