Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies

@article{Aumann1974SubjectivityAC,
  title={Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies},
  author={R. Aumann},
  journal={Journal of Mathematical Economics},
  year={1974},
  volume={1},
  pages={67-96}
}
  • R. Aumann
  • Published 1974
  • Economics
  • Journal of Mathematical Economics
Subjectivity and correlation, though formally related, are conceptually distinct and independent issues. We start by discussing subjectivity. A mixed strategy in a game involves the selection of a pure strategy by means of a random device. It has usually been assumed that the random device is a coin flip, the spin of a roulette wheel, or something similar; in brief, an ‘objective’ device, one for which everybody agrees on the numerical values of the probabilities involved. Rather oddly, in… Expand

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