Subgame Perfect Implementation

  title={Subgame Perfect Implementation},
  author={John. Moore and Rafael Repullo},
This paper examines the use of stage mechanisms in implementation problems and provides a partial characterization of the set of subgam e perfect implementable choice rules. It is shown that, in many economic environments, virtually an y choice rule can be implemented. To illustrate the power of this approach, the paper discusses a number of models in which it is possible to implement the first-best (although it wouldn't have been possible to do so without using stage mechanisms). The diversity… 
On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
A nuanced picture is established over the subgame perfect implementability of compromise rules, as a function of the compromise threshold, which contrasts with scoring rules that all fail to be sub game perfect implementable and with several Condorcet rules which are subgameperfect implementable.
Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms
It is shown that subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms — which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration — have severe behavioral constraints because the fines induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration.
Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions
Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
The authors study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences via Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy. The main result is that if there are at least three
Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem
It is shown that Moore- Repullo mechanisms may not yield truthful revelation in pure or totally mixed strategies as the amount of asymmetric information goes to zero, and it is argued that a wide class of extensive-form mechanisms are subject to this fragility.
Implementation with near complete information: The case of subgame perfection
While monotonicity is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for Nash implementation and often a demanding one, almost any (non-monotonic, for instance) social choice rule can be implemented
Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies: complete information
The authors investigate the implementation of social choice functions that map to lotteries over alternatives. They require virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. Under very
Repeated Implementation with Finite Mechanisms and Complexity
This paper examines the problem of repeatedly implementing an ecient social choice function when the agents’ preferences evolve randomly. We show that the freedom to set dierent mechanisms at dierent


Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
The concept of a dominance solvable voting scheme is presented as a weakening of the strategy-proofness requirement: it relies on successive elimination of dominated strategies and generalizes the