Subgame Perfect Implementation : A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition

@inproceedings{Uniuersit2003SubgamePI,
  title={Subgame Perfect Implementation : A Necessary and Almost Sufficient Condition},
  author={DILIP ABREU Haruard Uniuersit},
  year={2003}
}
  • DILIP ABREU Haruard Uniuersit
  • Published 2003
We present a necessary and almost sufftcient condition for subgame perfect implementation of social choice correspondences. In societies with at least three individuals, any social choice correspondence which satisfies no veto power and our necessary Condition a is subgame perfect implementable. Thus Condition GL is analogous to monotonicity which, by Maskin’s celebrated characterization, is necessary and, in a similar way, almost sufficient for Nash implementation. Journal of Economic… CONTINUE READING
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