Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Ascending Combinatorial Auctions

@article{Sano2015SubgamePE,
  title={Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Ascending Combinatorial Auctions},
  author={Ryuji Sano},
  journal={ERN: Auctions},
  year={2015}
}
  • Ryuji Sano
  • Published 26 June 2015
  • Economics
  • ERN: Auctions
This paper considers a class of combinatorial auctions with ascending prices, which includes the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and core-selecting auctions. In every ascending auction, the Vickrey-target strategy, i.e., bidding up to the Vickrey price based on provisional valuations, constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium when bidders are single-minded. This equilibrium outcome exists in the bidder-optimal core with respect to true valuations. However, the equilibrium outcome is unfair in… 

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