Sub-Regulating Elections
@article{Nou2014SubRegulatingE, title={Sub-Regulating Elections}, author={Jennifer Nou}, journal={The Supreme Court Review}, year={2014}, volume={2013}, pages={135 - 182} }
Agency deadlocks are a recurring feature of election-related administrative agencies. Such agencies are often designed by Congress with even-numbered bipartisan commissions with majoritarian voting rules. Using Arizona v. Intertribal Council as a springboard, this Article examines how courts should treat commissioner tie votes when they concern issues of statutory interpretation. In particular, it argues that courts should not defer to the blocking coalition, but rather apply an institutional… CONTINUE READING
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