Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare

  title={Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare},
  author={Jon R. Lindsay},
  journal={Security Studies},
  pages={365 - 404}
  • J. Lindsay
  • Published 1 July 2013
  • Computer Science
  • Security Studies
Stuxnet, the computer worm which disrupted Iranian nuclear enrichment in 2010, is the first instance of a computer network attack known to cause physical damage across international boundaries. Some have described Stuxnet as the harbinger of a new form of warfare that threatens even the strongest military powers. The influential but largely untested Cyber Revolution thesis holds that the internet gives militarily weaker actors asymmetric advantages, that offense is becoming easier while defense… 
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