Studying the Anonymity Trilemma with a Discrete-event Mix Network Simulator

@article{Piotrowska2021StudyingTA,
  title={Studying the Anonymity Trilemma with a Discrete-event Mix Network Simulator},
  author={Ania M. Piotrowska},
  journal={Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society},
  year={2021}
}
  • Ania M. Piotrowska
  • Published 26 July 2021
  • Computer Science
  • Proceedings of the 20th Workshop on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
In this work, we present a discrete event mix network simulator, that allows analysing how anonymity, latency, and bandwidth overhead are affected by various design choices (i.e., network topology, mixing technique, volume of traffic, packet size or use of cover traffic). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such simulator as work on it began in 2017 to analyze the Loopix mix network, and the code of our simulator is available under an open-source license. To demonstrate the… 

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